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ABSTRACT 
 
The role of international agricultural research centers (IARCs) has long been a 
subject of discussion, often with emphasis that they should conduct research that 
produces international public goods (IPGs). However, centers still face a dilemma on 
how to balance between IPGs and location-specific work. This paper contributes to 
the development of principles by which they should position themselves. Transaction 
cost economics was applied to develop a framework, which is then illustrated with an 
empirical case study of legume research at the International Crops Research Institute 
for the Semi-Arid Tropics. A participatory mapping technique (Net-Map) was 
combined with key informant interviews in India, Malawi and Ethiopia. We find that 
IARCS play an important role in germplasm improvement, the field in which they 
have a comparative advantage. However, due to insufficient capacity of national 
systems, they also engage in downstream activities. This reduces incentives for 
governments and donors to overcome governance challenges.  
Keywords: Agricultural innovation; comparative advantage; research spillovers; 
transaction costs; CGIAR 
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1. Introduction 
The first millennium development goal aims to halve the proportion of people who suffer from 
extreme poverty and hunger. The 2008 World Development Report (World Bank, 2007) stresses 
the importance of agriculture-led growth to achieve these targets. Although there are differences 
across regions, productivity growth has driven agriculture’s global success. This success has been 
closely linked to investments in agricultural research and development (R&D) (Alston et al., 
2000; Pardey et al., 2006; Raitzer and Kelley, 2008; Renkow and Byerlee, 2010). International 
agricultural research, therefore, plays an important role in exploiting advances in agricultural 
science to improve the lives of the poor in developing countries (Zeigler and Mohanty, 2010).  
The international agricultural research centers (IARCs) that form the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) evolved as the main international system of 
agricultural research with the aim to reduce poverty and achieve food security while sustaining 
natural resources. To achieve these goals, priority setting for the CGIAR1  must have a clear 
direction in pursuing long-term strategic goals. The CGIAR centers face the challenge of finding 
a balance between system-level goals resulting from basic and strategic research activities, which 
are located on the upstream side, and involvement in delivery programmes located downstream. 
The general consensus has been that the CGIAR should concentrate on the upstream side, 
conducting research that produces international public goods (IPGs). However, there is often no 
functional research-development (R-D) pathway, which would ensure that CGIAR research 
results are implemented on the ground. In particular, there is often no well-defined link between 
the outputs of the CGIAR and complementary activities that are expected to be conducted by 
national and local entities, such as national agricultural research and extension organizations 
(Sagasti and Timmer 2008). Downstream, the lack of adoption is attributed to the institutional 
context, especially the failure of government to provide the enabling conditions for uptake.  
The alternative view is that achieving impact requires involvement by international centers in 
activities such as adaptation, dissemination, extension, technical assistance, policy advice, and 
training (Pingali and Kelley, 2007). Therefore, even though they should have a clear direction in 
                                                            
1
 It should be noted that although the discussion focuses on the CGIAR, the international agricultural research system 
also includes other centers which are not part of the CGIAR. 
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pursuing long-term strategic goals, this should also encompass some degree of flexibility. In 
order to effectively address agricultural development concerns, the centers are expected to be 
open to change and respond sensitively to the wishes of a broad array of local stakeholder groups 
(Horton and Mackay, 2003).  
To take full advantage of talents and opportunities of different actors in the wider agricultural 
innovation system, a reform process of the CGIAR was initiated in 2009 (CGIAR SRF, 2011).  
The CGIAR Fund was established to finance thematic CGIAR Research Programs (CRPs) that 
involve several centers. Funding is allocated through two funding windows, one channeling funds 
to the overall system, and one to specific CRPs, with the goal to ensure increased and coordinated 
funding linked to system agenda and priorities. However, donors preferred to have a third 
window to be able to channel funds directly to specific centers and projects. This suggests that 
there is still tension between the focus on the generation of international public goods (IPGs), as 
guided by the strategy and results framework (SRF), and more location-specific activities to be 
funded under bilateral projects in Window 3 through which donors pursue their priorities. 
It is therefore crucial, as the CGIAR undergoes this reform process, to analyze the outstanding 
debate on the comparative advantage of the international centers, and the question of what 
activities they should focus on. So far, the international public goods (IPG) concept has been put 
forth to guide decisions on what the CGIAR centers should do, but as will be discussed in section 
3.2, there are contrasting views on this criterion. This paper aims to contribute to this debate by 
developing a framework based on concepts of the New Institutional Economics to identify the 
factors that determine the comparative advantage of IARCs. This framework is illustrated with an 
empirical case study conducted in India, Ethiopia and Malawi. 
From a normative point of view, the comparative advantage of IARCs is related to the question as 
to what governance structure is best suited for the different types of transactions involved in 
research and in the implementation of research findings. Transaction cost economics, a branch of 
the New Institutional Economics, offers an analytical approach that aligns transactions that differ 
in their attributes with governance structures that differ in their costs and competence so as to 
achieve a cost-effective result (Williamson, 1991). The paper adapts this transaction cost 
economics framework to the specific features of agricultural research organizations with the aim 
to provide conceptual guidance on how impact from international agricultural research can be 
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achieved in the most cost-effective way. In order to use this approach, it is necessary to specify 
the different transactions involved in the development and uptake of products from international 
agricultural research. An empirical case study of an important area of agricultural research was 
conducted for this purpose: research that aims to improve legume crops, which is supported by 
one of the fifteen CGIAR centers, the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid 
Tropics (ICRISAT). Legumes, which include crops such as beans and lentils, also referred to as 
the “meat of the poor”, make significant contributions in developing countries as a source of 
protein. They also play an important role in maintaining soil fertility as they are able to fix 
nitrogen. 
In the empirical case study, an innovative empirical research tool called “Net-Map” was used.  
Net-Map is a participatory mapping technique (Schiffer and Hauck, 2010), which was applied in 
three developing countries to identify the different activities (transactions) and organizations 
involved in research on improved legumes and their promotion. After developing a typology of 
transactions based on the empirical study, a transaction cost economics framework was 
developed and used to analyze the comparative advantage of different organizations in 
conducting the different types of transactions. By integrating contextual factors, the framework 
also serves to identify why international centers engage in activities for which they are not 
expected to have a comparative advantage vis-à-vis national or local organizations, as was the 
case in all three case study countries. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief account of the evolution of the 
international agricultural research centers (IARCs), their rationale and their governance 
challenges. Section 3 reviews the concept of “international public goods”, which has so far 
dominated the debate on what IARCs should and should not do. Section 4 presents the 
methodology, and Section 5 presents the case study of groundnut improvement, taking Malawi as 
an example. Section 6 develops the conceptual framework based on transaction cost economics, 
using the empirical case study for illustration. Section 7 discusses the application of the 
framework, and Section 8 concludes. 
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2. The international agricultural research system: Rationale, evolution and governance 
challenges 
The origins of international agricultural research centers (IARCs) date back to the work of the 
Rockefeller and Ford Foundations in the 1940s and 1950s, which saw the establishment of 
overseas rural development activities aimed at increasing the agricultural productivity in 
developing countries (Herdt, 2012). In 1971, international agricultural research became 
institutionalized in the form of the CGIAR system, which between the 80s and 90s expanded to 
15 different centers, each focusing on one key area of agricultural research. Over time, the 
mandate of IARCs in the CGIAR has expanded to include reduction of rural poverty, increasing 
food security, improvement of human health and nutrition, and ensuring more sustainable 
management of natural resources. These goals are also emphasized in the World Development 
Report 2008 on “Agriculture for Development”, which stresses the importance of agriculture-led 
growth for reducing poverty, achieving food security and contributing to sustainable resource 
management (World Bank 2007). It has long been acknowledged that productivity improvements, 
based on investments in agricultural research, are key drivers for this growth (Alston et al., 2000). 
The CGIAR system plays an important role in this regard, as it employs almost 10,000 scientists 
and staff and has a funding volume of more than 870 million US$ (CGIAR, 2012: 3).  
While contribution of the CGIAR to agricultural development has been widely acknowledged2, 
the organizational structure of the CGIAR system has been subject to debate and reform efforts 
for decades. As a recent review by McCalla (2014) indicates, these reform efforts did not lead to 
major changes in the institutional structure of the system. Being a large institution comprising 
diverse interest groups of political players (donors) as well as operational ones (centers and their 
research partners) and strategic ones (advisory bodies), the CGIAR is inevitably confronted with 
governance and co-ordination challenges (Kassam, 2006; Alston et al. 1998). In the first quarter 
of the century after their establishment, the centers remained under a loosely-knit, decentralized 
structure and received a large share of unrestricted funds based on voluntary contributions 
(Anderson, 1998). The centers were independently governed and research programs were 
                                                            
2
 The CGIAR played a prominent role in the “Green Revolution” in Asia, the unprecedented increase in food 
production in Asia starting in the 1960s that was made possible by the promotion of high-yielding varieties. 
According to the CGIAR’s website, the current overall benefits of CGIAR research in Asia are estimated at US$10.8 
billion a year for rice, US$2.5 billion for wheat, and US$0.8 billion for maize (see http://www.cgiar.org/who-we-
are/). 
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directed by centre boards and management (Herdt, 2012). Over time, poor coordination among 
donors and an increasing amount of “special project” funds reduced the ability of the centers to 
pursue long-term priorities. The result has been a lack of a system-wide vision and strategy for 
impact, limited sense of overall ownership, duplicate mandates and loss of system efficiency, 
complex and cumbersome governance and lack of accountability. At a meeting of stakeholders of 
the CGIAR system in 2008, rising concerns over these problems and stagnating funding levels 
led to the decision to promote a fundamental institutional reform of the CGIAR system (BCG, 
2009:5). 
A key factor affecting the desired outcomes from the CGIAR is the role played by donor 
countries and other organizations and their indirect influence on the CGIAR research agenda. 
First, investment patterns still reflect the dominant position and contributions of a small group of 
donors (Table 1). Secondly, the UN bodies, aside from providing financial resources that support 
the CGIAR's science advisory body, also nominate the members and chair of the Independent 
Science and Partnership Council (ISPC) for approval by the CGIAR (Herdt, 2012). Third, US 
grant-making foundations operate under legal constraints that do not give them a free hand in 
deciding what projects they should fund (Council on Foundations, 2011).  
Until the Gates Foundation came in as a key donor, the relative importance of private foundations 
and support from national governments to the CGIAR had weakened (Pingali and Kelley, 2007). 
The private sector has also not provided substantial financial support to the system, even though 
they also benefit from it (Alston et al., 1998). These financial constraints and the requirement by 
donors to show impact pushed centers down the Research-Development (R-D) continuum (see 
next section), inducing them to engage in more location-specific research and extension activities 
(Bertram 2006). Katyal and Mruthyunjaya (2003) observed that centers were overstretched and 
compelled by donors to oblige to pet downstream projects. This is a shift from way the CGIAR 
system was initially crafted to encourage funding of long-term research institutes, but keeping aid 
professionals from setting research agendas and hiring scientists (McCalla, 2014). 
[Table 1 here] 
In 2008, a comprehensive review of the structure and activities of the CGIAR was carried out 
(CGIAR Independent Review Panel, 2008). The review noted that there was proliferation of 
CGIAR programs and dispersal of research focus, which impeded effectiveness. The reform 
 
 
  
 
   
7 
 
process was initiated to effectively harness strengths and assets of different CGIAR centers and 
improve the organizational structure of the system (CGIAR SRF, 2011). The CGIAR Consortium 
now provides a single contact point for donors and organizes the work of the 15 centers under the 
cross-cutting CGIAR Research Programs (CRPs). Donors are expected to channel their funds 
through the newly established CGIAR Fund, which has three funding windows3. Window 1 
provides unrestricted contributions to be to CRPs, while Window 2 allows donors to target 
specific CRPs (CGIAR SRF, 2011). Even though these two windows provide a the opportunity to 
finance research in accordance with the strategy and results framework (SRF) of the system, a 
significant proportion of funding is still allocated through Window 3. Moreover, in 2012, more 
than half of the funds provided to the CGIAR system were still provided through bilateral 
funding from donors to centers outside these funding windows. This indicates that, so far, a major 
element of the reform has not yet been implemented. 
There is still uncertainty on how the relationship between the Consortium and the centers will 
evolve over time, especially regarding oversight and accountability (Ozgediz, 2012). In 2015, the 
structural reforms implemented in the previous years were still subject to discussion and potential 
revisions. Ultimately, the reform aims to result in a more centralized system of CGIAR 
governance. This move has not been without criticism. Hartmann (2009) sees the CGIAR reforms 
as moving research decisions too far away from center scientists, who interact more frequently 
with national colleagues, farmers and national governments and therefore understand local needs. 
Ekboir (2009) argued that it will be vital to develop a coordinated system of decentralized 
experimentation with centralized learning to address the challenges that prompted the reform 
process. Against this background of a major reform, which has remained contested and only 
partly implemented, it seems important to reconsider the question of the comparative advantage 
of the CGIAR centers, as it is essential for current and future reform efforts. The next section 
reviews the concepts that have, so far been applied to deal with this question. 
                                                            
3
 According to the CGIAR Fund update for February 2014 (p. 2), the total inflows as of December 31, 2013 
comprised USD 292.3 million for Window 1, 149.8 million for Window 2 and 253.5 million for Window 3. Besides 
the window funding, there is still a large contribution from bilateral projects, which in 2013 accounted for 45% of all 
CRP funding (CGIAR Financial Report, 2013: 18). 
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3.  Assessing the comparative advantage of CGIAR centers  
The question of the comparative advantage of the CGIAR centers vis-à-vis national agricultural 
research and extension organizations has been subject to long-standing debate. Two concepts 
have been developed in this context: the concept of a research - development continuum, and the 
concept of International Public Goods. 
3.1. The agricultural research - development continuum 
The concept of the research-development continuum is displayed in Figure 1. It outlines the 
primary domains of advanced research institutes (ARIs), a term used for research organizations 
located in industrialized countries, the IARCs, the national agricultural research and extension 
systems (NARES), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and farmers (Craswell and de 
Vries’, 2001; cited in CGIAR, 2006). Four types of research are identified: basic, strategic, 
applied and adaptive. Basic research is designed to generate new understanding, strategic 
research aims for the solution of specific research problems, applied research aims to create new 
technologies and participatory-adaptive research is needed to adjust the technologies to the 
specific needs of a particular set of users (in this case, farmers) within their specific 
environmental conditions. 
[Figure 1 here] 
According to this concept, the CGIAR should concentrate on strategic research, which is located 
between the basic and the applied. This type of research is to be carried out in different countries 
and focuses on technologies that fit relevant ecological and production conditions across the 
developing world (CGIAR Science Council, 2006). The centers should collaborate with ARIs, 
who have their focus on basic research, and with the NARES, who cover the spectrum from 
strategic to applied and participatory-adaptive research. 
3.2. The concept of international public goods (IPGs) in the CGIAR 
To provide guidance on the question as to where in the research-development continuum the 
IARCs should locate themselves, the concept international public goods (IPGs) has played a 
prominent role. It has been used as a major criterion to for setting priorities in the CGIAR system 
(CGIAR Science Council, 2005). The concept of public goods, as used by economists, can be 
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traced back to Samuelson’s (1954:387 ) theory of public expenditure. According to his theory, 
pure public goods differ from private goods by the two criteria of being non-rivalrous in 
consumption and at the same time non-excludable. Non-excludability implies that it is either 
impossible or very costly to exclude those who do not pay for the good from utilizing it, and once 
the good has been produced its benefits (or harm) accrue to everyone. The non-rivalry criterion 
means that any one person’s consumption of the public good has no effect on the amount of it 
available for others. The other goods in this classification are common-pool resources (non-
excludability, but rivalry in consumption), and club goods (non-rivalry in consumption, but 
excludability). 
The rationale for public sector involvement in agricultural research is based on the fact that 
agricultural technologies have characteristics of public goods, especially if they are not embodied 
in a particular technology, or – as in case of seeds – if they can be reproduced by the farmers 
themselves. Accordingly, the rationale for the CGIAR in producing public goods stems from the 
fact that private firms have limited interest in agricultural technologies that are relevant to 
smallholders in developing countries since they do not have the capacity to capture much of the 
benefit through proprietary claims (Pingali and Kelley, 2007). There are also coordination 
problems that render the development of such technologies unattractive to individual 
governments and private agents (Spielman, 2007). Since farmers in many developing nations still 
mainly rely on the public sector for agricultural technology (Pineiro 2007), publicly funded 
research centers are expected to step in to fill this gap. 
Public goods can be defined at the local, national, regional, international or global levels. Local 
public goods are available within a district, municipality or state; national public goods only 
within the borders of a country; regional public goods to two or more contiguous countries within 
a geographic or political environment; international public goods to two or more countries across 
geographic, political or continental divides; and global public goods are available to all countries 
(Ryan, 2006). The view that CGIAR centers should focus on provision of public goods at the 
international level (IPGs) began to be explicitly mentioned in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
(Sagasti and Timmer 2008). This concept has since been subject of discussion in various fora 
(CGIAR Science Council, 2006; 2008). Harwood (2006, pp. 381) defines IPGs in the CGIAR 
context as: 
 
 
  
 
   
10 
 
“Research outputs of knowledge and technology generated through strategic and applied 
research that are applicable and readily accessible internationally to address generic issues and 
challenges consistent with CGIAR goals”. 
According to this definition, it is not sufficient that the CGIAR outputs are available 
internationally (in fact, every document placed on the internet with free access would fulfill this 
criterion), they also have to address generic problems, indicating that they do not focus on 
location-specific solutions.  This criterion is linked to the rationale for an international system of 
agricultural research, which is justified by economies of scale in agricultural technology 
development (e.g., in germplasm improvement using modern breeding techniques, and by 
“spillovers”, i.e. benefits that accrue to other regions than those for which the agricultural 
research was conducted. 
3.3. Drawbacks of the IPG criterion 
The IPG criterion has been criticized for not being refined enough to provide clear guidance for 
the priority setting of the IARCs. Ryan (2006: 5) noted that "The IARCs (and the Science 
Council) are currently wrestling with both the identification of these boundaries (of the different 
types of economic goods) and how to weigh up choices about the focus on the more obvious 
“public” outputs, versus other goals of the CGIAR related to impacts on poverty, food and 
nutrition security and the environment". This concept can be more easily applied to traditional 
CGIAR research, like germplasm improvement and development of new crop varieties, for which 
economies of scale and spill-over effects can be determined more easily compared to other types 
of technologies or knowledge, such as natural resource management. 
The IPG concept has also been criticized for not adequately taking into account what is required 
for the IARCs to achieve impact. IPGs have to be utilized by national programs, organizations or 
individuals in a specific location to achieve impact. The impact pathways for IPGs will be 
influenced by the institutional context, including policies and political systems (Kherallah and 
Kirsten, 2001). Some critics consider the IPG criterion as "a conceptual barrier4 with an 
unrealistic division of labor between research and development" (CGIAR Science Council 2008, 
p. 3). Since obstacles to achieving impact are particularly pronounced in developing countries, it 
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 Jonathan Wooley, during Special Session on IPGs at the CGIAR AGM, Maputo, Mozambique November 27, 2008 
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has been argued that "IPGs should not be a shelter to hide behind the institutional bottlenecks"5. 
For instance, if seed markets are a limiting factor, would producing improved lines be a 'relevant' 
IPG? Some critics6 argue that "the most significant transformations led by the CGIAR took place 
before the advent of ‘IPGs’" (CGIAR Science Council 2008, p. 4).  
These arguments show that there are contrasting views on whether the IPG concept should be the 
key criterion that offers strategic direction on what the CGIAR centers should do or not do. 
Against this background, this paper therefore develops a more refined conceptual framework to 
provide conceptual guidance for assessing the comparative advantage of IARCs. 
4. Methodology 
The research presented in this paper consists of two components:  (i) A case study, which aims to 
provide a detailed account of the research and dissemination process of improved technologies 
produced by international agricultural research centers, and (ii) a conceptual framework, which  
defines the functional boundaries of IARCs based on their comparative advantage, taking the 
case study results into account. The case study focused on examples from the breeding program 
for legume varieties at the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics 
(ICRISAT). The fieldwork was conducted in three countries that differ with regard to the 
capacity of their agricultural research systems and the state of their seed systems: India, Malawi 
and Ethiopia. This choice of countries enabled the authors to compare how differences in 
capacity influenced decision-making on the activities that ICRISAT was involved in. The three 
countries were also chosen since they are leading producers of either groundnut or chickpea in 
their respective regions, and because ICRISAT has a country office in each of them.  
Data collection methods included a review of adoption studies, the use of a participatory mapping 
tool called Net-map. and key informant interviews. Respondents included ICRISAT scientists, 
national partners, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), seed companies and certification 
agencies, male and female farmers and other stakeholders involved in the research and promotion 
of improved groundnut and chickpea varieties. For the development of a transaction costs 
framework, it was important to understand all transactions involved in the R-D process. In order 
                                                            
5
 Gebisa Ejeta, during Special Session on IPGs at the CGIAR AGM, Maputo, Mozambique November 27, 2008 
6
 Same as footnote above 
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to achieve this understanding in a participatory manner, the Net-map procedure was chosen. It 
involved asking a series of questions regarding the main actors, their linkages, and the level of 
influence of each actor on the intended outcome (adoption of new varieties). Follow-up questions 
were asked on governance challenges involved in the process. Intensive interviews were 
conducted during the Net-map exercise, which were then recorded and transcribed to provide 
qualitative information for further analysis. This information was supplemented by a review of 
supplementary documents including project reports, working papers and workshop proceedings.  
For reasons of space, this paper reports in detail only the findings from the Net-Map approach 
that focused on the groundnut variety CG 77 in Malawi, as an example to identify the different 
research and dissemination steps to be considered (i.e. the transactions). Information on the other 
two case studies is reported in more condensed from and in a comparative perspective. 
To develop the conceptual framework for analyzing the comparative advantage of the CGIAR 
centers in conducting different activities along the research-impact pathway, the case study was 
combined with an application of the fiscal federalism literature (Oates, 1972) and transaction cost 
economics (Williamson, 1991; Birner and Wittmer, 2004). This approach follows earlier 
applications of the fiscal federalism literature and transaction costs economics to analyze the 
appropriate level of decentralization for different types of rural services (Bardhan, 2002; Birner 
and von Braun, 2009). 
5. Case study: The legumes improvement program at ICRISAT 
Improved legume varieties with higher productivity and disease resistance can make a substantial 
contribution to the well-being of poor farmers. Legumes, however, have two characteristics that 
make their seed production not very attractive to the commercial seed industry, leading to market 
failures. These are the self-pollinating nature, which implies that farmers can reproduce their own 
seeds, and the low seed multiplication ratio, i.e. the low number of seeds to be produced from one 
single seed when it is sown and harvested, which renders seed production relatively expensive. 
Hence, breeding, adaptation, multiplication and dissemination of improved legumes typically 
relies on publicly funded international and national agricultural research and distribution systems. 
ICRISAT currently leads the CGIAR research program on grain legumes and collaborates with 
                                                            
7
 This variety is also known as ICGV-SM 83708 and ICGMS 42. 
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three other CGIAR centers and partners to increase the production, value and nutritional quality 
of grain legumes cultivated in the poorest regions of the world.  
The results from using the Net-map tool to understand all the transactions involved in research 
and uptake of the CG7 groundnut variety are presented in Figure 2. The diagram shows the 
different transactions and the actors performing them, including ICRISAT, donors, relevant 
ministries, NARS and agricultural universities, extension systems, seed companies, NGOs, 
farmers and farmer organizations. 
[Figure 2 here] 
The arrows indicate the different transactions, and the numbers indicate the sequence of 
activities, which are explained at the bottom of the diagram. The circles indicate the rating of 
influence of the actors (on a scale of 1-8) by the respondents of the Net-map tool. They rated their 
influence on the final outcome, which was defined as the goal that the improved seed varieties are 
actually adopted by the farmers. The stars represent governance challenges in extension and seed 
systems that were identified by the respondents. 
The following transactions were identified: (i) The first step was the identification of the 
production constraints faced by farmers and the breeding objectives to be pursued; (ii) The 
variety was bred at the ICRISAT headquarters in India in 1977/78 by the crossing two lines 
(USA 20 and TMV 10); (iii) Breeding material was supplied to different regions; in Southern 
Africa it was introduced by ICRISAT in 1982 under the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) Groundnut Project, which involved nine countries and was funded by the 
German Society for International Cooperation (formerly GTZ) and later the International 
Development Research Centre (IDRC); (iv) Starting from the 1983/84 growing season, yield 
trials, testing and adaptation were conducted across locations against existing varieties; (v) The 
CG7 variety was released and notified in 1990 upon approval by a varietal release committee; the 
release was based on submission of performance data reflecting a yield advantage of between 11 
and 35%. In 1991 it was released as MGV 4 in Zambia and in 1999 as Serenut 1R in Uganda. (vi) 
Breeder and foundation seed were produced by ICRISAT, while the National Seed Company of 
Malawi produced certified seed, but there was low demand from farmers; (vii) The variety was 
promoted by ICRISAT and partners to create awareness among farmers through the distribution 
of small seed samples, field days, on-farm demonstrations, farmers field schools, the media and 
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other means; (viii) Further foundation and certified seed production was carried out through 
ICRISAT’s revolving scheme that involved contract growers who got seed on credit. ICRISAT 
also established community seed banks to hasten the diffusion of the variety. NGOs (World 
Vision, CARE, Plan International, ActionAid, CADECOM) and smallholder farmer and seed 
producers associations like the National Smallholder Farmers’ Association of Malawi 
(NASFAM), and Association of Smallholder Seed Multiplication Action Group (ASSMAG) also 
started producing seed; (ix) Private seed companies (Peacock Enterprises, CPM Agri-Enterprises, 
Demeter Agriculture, SeedCo, Pannar Seed, Funuwe, Pantochi etc) joined in certified seed 
production as legumes got included in the government subsidy program in 2009 and created high 
demand for new varieties; (x) The variety was taken up by farmers, with incentives from the 
input subsidy program (coupons), and also through farmer to farmer exchange. (xi) Several 
organizations in the seed sector came together to sell CG7 and other varieties under the Malawi 
Seed Alliance (MASA) umbrella.  
The Net-map exercise also served to identify the governance challenges involved in the different 
transactions. As the capacity of the national system in Malawi for testing of the new variety was 
rather limited, ICRISAT decided to post a groundnut breeder from its Indian headquarters to 
Malawi. He spent five years in Malawi to initiate and coordinate regional testing of material and 
facilitate varietal release, and after he returned to India, ICRISAT maintained the scientist 
position at the Chitedze Agricultural Research Station. During an interview he explained "Each 
country has its own protocol for variety release. CG 7 was selected among the several hundred 
breeding populations carried by me to Malawi in 1982/83. It was evaluated in Cooperative 
Regional Yield Trials in the SADC region during 1983/84 - 1986/86. After this, it was further 
evaluated in national trials / on-farm verification trials in some countries (in Malawi 1988/89 and 
in Zambia 1987/88 -1988/89). In 1988, it was accepted as pre-release cultivar in Zambia and was 
named as MGS 4. Varietal release is a long drawn process in some countries". CG7 was released 
in 1990 and for a long time was a typical case of a variety that remained on the research station 
shelf long after its release even though it had a proven yield advantage. As can be seen from steps 
8-13 in Figure 2, the variety was only adopted after donors provided resources for seed 
multiplication and promotion to ICRISAT, NGOs and other seed producers. The National Seed 
Company of Malawi that had initially produced foundation and certified seed was taken over by 
Monsanto in 1999. It took further interventions by ICRISAT and partners in the area of 
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agricultural extension (e.g., field demonstrations) as well as a subsidy program to get the variety 
adopted.  
To date, even though government institutions like the Extension Department and Department of 
Agricultural Research Services (DARS) do exist, capacity gaps still remain and the ICRISAT 
Malawi office continues to be engaged in downstream activities. This explains why the Center 
was ranked highest in terms of level of influence on the desired outcome, i.e. wide adoption of 
CG7 among farmers (Figure 2).  
For reasons of scope, the findings from the other Net-map exercises are not reported here, but the 
main steps in the research and promotion process were similar. Both in India and Ethiopia, 
varieties were tested by agricultural universities or research stations and the results submitted to a 
varietal release committee.  However, unlike Malawi, seed corporations played an important role 
in seed multiplication. With regards to technology dissemination, all the chickpea and groundnut 
varieties required promotion efforts by ICRISAT and partners, even in countries with a higher 
capacity of the National Research and Extension Systems. 
In the next section, the findings from the case studies are used to develop a conceptual framework 
to analyze the comparative advantage of IARCs in conducting the different transactions that were 
identified, taking the governance challenges revealed by the case study into account. 
6. Conceptual Framework 
The transaction cost economics approach used here is based on the so-called “discriminating 
alignment hypothesis” developed by Williamson (1991), according to which “transactions that 
differ in their attributes are aligned with governance structures that differ in costs and 
competence so as to achieve an economizing result” (Williamson, 1991, p. 281 ). The first sub-
section introduces the basic structure of this framework, and the following sub-sections apply the 
framework using the case study results. 
6.1. Determining the comparative cost-effectiveness of IARCs versus national systems 
The decision on whether a transaction should be carried out by a an international research center 
or a national organization can be conceptualized as a choice between a more centralized 
(international) and a more decentralized (national) governance structure. The choice between 
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these governance structures is influenced by the attributes of the respective transactions Figure 3, 
which is based on Williamson’s (1991) original approach, illustrates this choice problem in a 
cost-effectiveness diagram. 
[Figure 3 here] 
The vertical axis displays the total cost involved in achieving a specified result of the respective 
transaction, including transaction costs and other costs. They include direct costs that can be 
directly assigned to the respective activity (such as the salary of the researchers and the cost of 
the research infrastructure) as well as the transaction costs, e.g., the costs of planning, 
coordination and supervision. 
The horizontal axis depicts the level of the attributes that influence the comparative advantage of 
different governance structure. The figure displays two different hypothetical cost curves8, which 
show how the total costs arising for achieving a specified result change, depending on the level of 
the attribute displayed on the horizontal axis. One curve depicts the costs arising for carrying out 
the transaction by an IARC (TCi), and the other depicts the total costs for carrying out the same 
transaction by a National Agricultural Research and Extension System (NARES) (TCn). 
The fiscal federalism literature (Oates, 1972) identifies economies of scale and potential for 
spillovers as important factors, which influence the appropriate level of decentralization. These 
factors are considered as attributes of transactions here. In the example displayed in the figure, 
the costs of providing the transaction increase more rapidly for the governance structure of the 
NARES (i.e. to the more decentralized governance structure), if the level of the respective 
attribute, for example, economies of scale, increases (moving to the right-hand side on the 
horizontal axis). This is indicated by the relatively steeper slope of the TCn cost curve. If the 
potential for economies of scale is low (moving to the left-hand side on the horizontal axis), the 
transaction is more economically provided by NARES. From point a1 onwards, it is more 
economic to assign the transaction to the IARC (i.e. to the more centralized governance 
structure), because the IARC will achieve the same result at a lower cost. Phrased differently, the 
diagram shows that from point a1 onwards, the governance structure of the IARC has a 
comparative advantage over NARES for carrying out the respective transaction.  
                                                            
8
 While the above comparison considers IARCs and NARES, we recognize that there are many other actors in the 
agricultural R&D process. IARCs often work in collaboration with partners on joint research projects. 
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Following the considerations of the IPG criterion explained above, the rationale is that the IARCs 
have higher set-up costs and higher running costs than NARES. Taking the case study as 
example, the salaries of ICRISAT researchers are much higher than those of staff employed in 
the NARES in Malawi. IARCs have a comparative advantage if they use their more expensive 
set-up to engage in activities with high economies of scale, such as applying expensive breeding 
techniques for crops that can be grown in different regions. The same argument applies to the 
attribute of spill-over effects, as indicated above. The term “spillovers” has been used in the 
international agricultural research community since the 1980s (Davis et al., 1987). Bantilan and 
Davis (1991) identify three types of spillovers: across-location, across- commodity and price 
spillovers. Technologies are said to have spillover potential if they have applicability to other 
agro-ecological locations or for a different crop (Deb and Bantilan, 2001; Shiferaw et. al, 2004). 
Price spillovers occur when the technological change at a specific location increases supply of the 
commodity and changes the price at other locations through trade. As long as the expected 
outputs are intended to be relevant to many agro-climatic conditions and achievable through 
spillovers, the location where research activities are carried out is of little significance (Ryan 
2006). Since the CGIAR centers have a global mandate, the research objectives and associated 
outputs are more likely to benefit other regions or countries (i.e. the potential impact domain is 
wider). It can, therefore, be expected that more farmers will be reached resulting in lower costs 
for a given outcome (level of adoption). The literature on decentralized governance also indicates 
that heterogeneity of local needs is an attribute that increases the comparative advantage of 
decentralized governance structures (see Birner and von Braun, 2009 and the fiscal federalism 
literature quoted there).  
The framework also identifies the role of contextual factors, in particular, the capacity of the 
respective organizations carrying out the transaction. In a cost-effectiveness diagram, low levels 
of achievement due to capacity constraints are depicted in form of a higher level of costs, since 
the diagram displays the costs for a defined unit of output. Figure 3 displays a case of low 
capacity of NARES, resulting in an upward shift of the respective cost curve (TCc). Accordingly, 
the point from which onwards IARCs have a comparative advantage over NARES moves 
towards the left-hand side to point a2. A reform or investment that results in increased capacity of 
the NARES would have the opposite effect (moving the TCn curve downwards and shifting the 
intersection of the curves to the right-hand side).  
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The application of the transaction costs framework to the question of decentralization has shown 
that the effect of some attributes on the level of decentralization depends on contextual factors 
(Birner and von Braun, 2009). This is in particular the case for the following two attributes: 
· Transaction-intensity: This attribute refers to transactions that have to be carried out 
frequently (transaction-intensity in terms of time) and in large areas (transaction-intensity in 
terms of space). Transaction intensity has been used to characterize transactions in service 
delivery (Pritchett & Woolcock, 2004; Birner and Linacre, 2008; Birner and von Braun, 
2009). The effect of transaction-intensity is ambiguous: One the one hand, this attribute 
increases the comparative advantage of NARES, because they have lower costs for carrying 
out a large number of transactions. On the other hand, the costs of supervising and ensuring 
the quality of activities with high transaction-intensity is high. This increases the comparative 
advantage of organizations with high capacity that are able to provide strong performance 
incentives for their staff. In case of low capacity of the NARES, transaction-intensity will 
increase the comparative advantage of the IARCs. 
· Scope for elite capture and corruption: If transactions are subject to these hazards, the extent 
to which a more centralized or a more decentralized organization has a comparative 
advantage depends on the capacity of the respective organizations to deal with these issues 
(Bardhan, 2002, Birner and von Braun, 2009). 
6.2. Types of transactions and their attributes 
6.2.1. Overview 
This section discusses how the approach outlined above can be applied in determining the 
comparative advantage of IARCs versus NARES in carrying out the agricultural research and 
development activities identified in the case study. For simplification, one can classify the types 
of transactions identified in the case study into the following types:  
· Planning and priority setting: The identification of breeding objectives (Step 1 in Figure 2) 
can be considered as a planning and priority setting transaction. Some breeding objectives can 
be considered rather universal, such as yield potential, while others are affected by a diversity 
of local preferences, such as taste and color. 
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· Technology development: Technology development transactions included activities such as 
setting up and maintaining the required infrastructure, getting access to genetic resources, 
establishing the partnerships required for research, as well as all activities involved in 
conducting the actual breeding activities. In Figure 2, activities from the initial crossing at the 
ICRISAT headquarters until the variety was incorporated into national breeding programs for 
evaluation (step 2-3) can be classified under technology development transactions. As shown 
in Figure 1, these activities range from basic and strategic research to participatory/adaptive 
research. The centers collect and maintain germplasm accessions, carry out crosses depending 
on breeding objectives, and release advanced breeding lines for adaptation, testing and 
release. 
· Field testing and varietal release: Promising cultivars were initially tested at the ICRISAT 
experiment stations before further testing on a larger scale in different agroecologies, and 
later in farmers’ fields. Varieties were approved for release if data from multi-locational 
testing indicated that they performed better compared to the existing best variety (steps 4-5 in 
Figure 2). 
· Multiplication: To obtain the required volumes of improved seed for sale/ distribution, seed 
multiplication is carried out in seed company farms or by using contract growers. 
Decentralized seed multiplication can also be carried out by small-scale farmers who then sell 
the seed locally. Many of the activities between step 6-15 in Figure 2 involved seed 
production, processing, storage and distribution. 
· Certification: Since most characteristics of improved seed are not outwardly visible, 
information asymmetries are likely as the knowledge on seed quality is retained by sellers 
(Byerlee et al., 2007). Seed certification, usually by an independent body, is used as a means 
of quality control. Multiplication transactions and certification are specific to embodied 
technologies such as seeds, whereas the other types of transactions identified above are 
equally relevant for disembodied types of technologies that the IARCs also develop, such as 
natural resource management practices. 
· Promotion: ICRISAT has received funding from various donors including the Norwegian 
Development Fund, Irish Aid, BMGF, the McKnight Foundation and the Australian Agency 
for International Development (AusAID), for seed multiplication and promotion of CG7. 
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Details of the activities conducted by ICRISAT together with NGOs and various departments 
under Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MoAFS) can be seen in steps 8-13 of 
Figure 2. The beneficiaries also had to undertake certain activities and incurred some costs 
aside from the cost of seed, e.g. they had to spend time and money to travel and to access 
extension agents. 
· Evaluation and impact assessment: Impact assessments (ex-post or ex-ante) are carried out 
to identify and measure the economic, social, and environmental consequences resulting from 
a program or project’s interventions (Walker et al. 2008). Expost evaluations serve as a 
means of showing accountability to donors and other stakeholders, and also help in learning 
on how to make agricultural research more effective (Horton and Mackay, 2003). Resource 
allocation and targeting decisions for research can be guided by rigorous ex ante evaluation of 
impacts, including spillover benefits across regions. 
Having categorized these activities, we can now make an assessment of the relevance of each 
attribute identified in sections 6.1 for the each of the of transactions in the agricultural research-
development continuum. The results are summarized in (Table 2). 
 
Table 2 about here  
 
6.2.2. Planning and priority setting transactions 
Priority setting activities together with resource mobilization require interaction with donors and 
other stakeholders who have knowledge on constraints facing the farming communities. Planning 
is carried out at the centre level to develop the global research agenda, and at the regional level to 
set priorities that address location-specific needs. These activities are associated with decision 
costs such as the direct costs of attending meetings (e.g. for strategic planning) and time spent in 
donor relations. The new system under CRPs exploits economies of scale and reduces transaction 
costs of interface activities. From a cost-effectiveness9 point of view, the risk of incurring 
decision failure costs (Birner and von Braun, 2009) arises if the research agenda is not driven by 
local needs leading to suboptimal decisions. 
                                                            
9
 Costs associated with achieving a set outcome are analyzed the outcome being held constant 
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Tools used for priority setting such as models for forecasting, scenario analysis and ex-ante 
impact assessment can be applied elsewhere, representing a spillover potential.  Planning 
transactions at the centers can therefore be associated with attributes of economies of scale and 
potential for spillovers and a more centralized approach is likely to reduce the costs. However, 
planning for the purpose of pursuing location-specific goals can be done more cost-effectively by 
the relevant government agencies in each country as it would otherwise involve high transaction 
intensity for the centers. 
6.2.3. Technology development transactions 
The running costs for research activities conducted by national system scientists may be lower 
compared to those of IARCs. However, depending on the sophistication of the techniques 
required, the results may be below expectations if research is delegated to a partner that does not 
have the required skill sets. In terms of a cost-effectiveness consideration, this loss in 
achievement can be expressed as “decision failure costs”. The research lag may also be longer 
resulting in higher overall costs for a given research output, if the NARS do not have sufficient 
capacity. 
The capacity to exploit economies of scale in agricultural R&D at a global scale is linked to the 
specialized assets that the centers possess. In the case study, considering that ICRISAT has a 
specific mandate on groundnut research (also chickpea, pigeonpea, sorghum and pearl millet), the 
physical and human assets that the institute possesses are specialized. For example, the gene bank 
contains germplasm accessions for these mandate crops that cannot serve other crops' needs in 
terms of seeds10. On the other hand, agricultural research, requires a multidisciplinary approach, 
e.g., an integrated genetic and natural resource management approach (Twomlow et al., 2008). 
Some form of site-specificity is required where synergy across themes is to be achieved. This is 
possible when stations are located in a “cheek-by-jowl” relation to complement each other and 
economize on inventory and transportation expenses (Williamson, 1991). For instance, ICRISAT 
has facilities like a gene bank, a molecular lab and a greenhouse as well as human resources 
comprising molecular scientists, breeders, pathologists and agronomists all working on the same 
crop.  
                                                            
10
 This statement applies with the exception of cases where there are across-commodity spillovers representing benefits for 
multiple crops 
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Where technical knowledge is relevant, such as in case of basic research activities (Figure 1), 
IARCs may be more suited to exploit economies of scale in providing or utilizing this 
knowledge. An example is the ICRISAT genomics research that is based at its headquarters in 
India, but serves the needs of both Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.  
Where the potential for spillovers is high, research programs and infrastructure can be centrally 
set up with assurance that the products can be transferred and applied in similar environments 
elsewhere. For example, Maredia and Byerlee (1999) quantified spillover benefits for improved 
wheat germplasm across agro-ecological boundaries. Spillovers from research in one region 
within a country to another have also been estimated. For example, Alston et. al (2011) measure 
the returns to the United States public agricultural research with spillover benefits across states. 
Developed country agricultural research systems also benefit from the technology spillovers 
generated by the CGIAR; Brennan (1986) measured the benefits to Australian wheat breeding 
programs of access to breeding materials from CIMMYT. Brennan and Bantilan (2003) and 
Brennan et. al. (2003) use case studies of production spillovers to Australia from the work of 
ICRISAT and the International Centre for Agricultural Research in the Dryland Areas 
(ICARDA), respectively. Pardey et al. (1996) measured benefits to US wheat and rice production 
from germplasm developed at CIMMYT and IRRI. In the case of CG 7, the variety was  not only 
released in Malawi, but also Zambia as MGV 4 in 1991, and Uganda as Serenut 1R in 1999 
(Shiferaw et. al, 2004). 
Basic and strategic research transactions can therefore be associated with attributes of high 
economies of scale and high potential for spillovers. Since a lot of interaction with farmers or 
travels to dispersed field locations is not required at this stage, basic and strategic research 
activities can be characterized by low transaction-intensity. In this case, a more centralized 
governance structure is likely to reduce transaction costs. However, participatory and adaptive 
research activities have lower economies of scale and a lower potential for spillovers. Hence, 
ceteris paribus, they can be carried out most cost-effectively by the decentralized national 
systems. The same applies for the evaluation of breeding lines in different agro-ecologies across 
the country  
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6.2.4. Field testing and varietal release transactions 
Field testing transactions have similar attributes to participatory and adaptive research since they 
involve testing of selected varieties across environments. However, the application of tight 
controls on variety release and seed trade presents a scope for elite capture and corruption. Plant 
breeders from the public sector may be protected from competition, as only varieties approved by 
the varietal release committee can be sold. These committees are typically composed of officials, 
and release is based on yields documented in government-run trials (Tripp and Rohrbach, 2001). 
In the case of the groundnut variety ICGV91114 in India, the performance of the variety was 
evident. Still, it may not have been released without lobbying from ICRISAT and the intervention 
of the Chief Minister (Birthal et al., 2012). The implication is the following: NARES would have 
a comparative advantage in field testing and varietal release based on the attributes of low 
economies of scale, low potential for spillovers and high transaction intensity. However, if the the 
scope for elite capture and corruption is taken into account, this comparative advantage will only 
prevail if they have a strong organizational capacity to address these challenges.  
6.2.5. Multiplication transactions 
Seed multiplication is carried out based on demand projections for a specific country. 
Accordingly, breeder and foundation seeds are produced by the research station or university that 
released the variety, while certified seeds are produced by state corporations or private firms. 
Seed production under centralized seed company farms may have higher economies of scale, but 
depending on the location of processing, storage and distribution facilities, there will be 
additional costs of transportation. The use of decentralized systems, such as contract growers, 
involves a high transaction-intensity, as constant supervision is required. These factors imply that 
seed multiplication can be carried out most cost-effectively by NARES, rather than IARCs. 
However, as was observed in Malawi, the local NARES organizations often lack the resources 
and incentives to perform this function as required. From the case studies, we noted that breeder 
seed production is not funded separately from the actual breeding activities. Moreover, case 
studies also showed that the NARES have insufficient numbers of research and seed technicians, 
and they lack processing, storage and distribution infrastructure. Breeders are rewarded for 
varieties they release and not seed multiplied, a system that does not create incentives for 
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promoting adoption. For these reasons, ICRISAT felt compelled to engage in seed production 
activities, even though they are characterized by high transaction-intensity. 
6.2.6. Certification transactions 
Seed certification is characterized by a medium level of transaction-intensity. Certification 
involves field inspections of the seed crop to guarantee the identity of the variety. Moreover, 
laboratory tests are required for quality attributes such as germination percentage, purity, seed 
health and moisture content. However, the transaction-intensity is lower than that of promotion 
transactions that require frequent interactions with a large number of farmers. Still, a 
decentralized governance structure involving smaller regional laboratories and locally based 
inspectors would provide a rapid response to seed producers. However, this approach is likely to 
present challenges in monitoring and maintaining quality standards (Cromwell et al., 1992). The 
responsibility for seed certification was placed on independent agencies in India (Andhra Pradesh 
State Seed Certification Agency) and in Malawi (Seed Services Unit), while in Ethiopia a quality 
assurance department was set up within the Ethiopian Seed Enterprise (ESE) itself. While this 
separation aims to avoid that the certification is compromised, the case study showed that this 
governance arrangement was not sufficient to guarantee seed quality. The fact that certification 
agencies are mostly financed by the government makes them vulnerable to budgetary constraints. 
For example, seed production plots in Malawi were visited fewer number of times than what is 
stipulated in the regulations, as the resources available were too limited. Moreover, inspectors 
with poor salaries are likely to engage in rent seeking behavior that might compromise the 
transparency and effectiveness of the certification procedure (cf. Tripp and Louwaars, 1997). 
Hence, certification transactions pose similar challenges as multiplication transactions. 
Decentralized governance structures (NARES) only have a comparative advantage if they have 
sufficient capacity to deal with the governance challenges involved, especially providing 
sufficient funding and avoiding bribery in the process. 
6.2.7. Promotion transactions  
Technologies that are available for dissemination require further local development and 
adaptation.  This makes it difficult to standardize activities such as extension, which reduces the 
economies of scale and the likelihood of spillovers. Promotion programs are characterized by 
high transaction-intensity in terms of time and space, as they require frequent interactions with 
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farmers and the deployment of large staff numbers throughout the country on a daily basis. These 
transactions should, therefore, be the responsibility of national systems who have local offices to 
facilitate monitoring and supervision and reduce transaction costs.   
Still, the transaction intensity varies depending on what is being promoted. For example, 
information on new varieties can be provided using mass media, whereas guidance on crop 
management practices such as tillage operations, spacing or methods of seed placement and 
fertilizer application requires more interactions with farmers (Birner and von Braun, 2009). There 
are situations where NARES may lack sufficient capacity to promote certain techniques. Until 
this capacity is developed, IARCs may have a comparative advantage in carrying out promotion 
activities, as has been seen in many natural resource management research projects (Harwood et 
al., 2006). The case study showed that competition between the international centers and the 
national system can also result in constraints. In the case of ICGV91114 in India, the variety 
faced a backlash from the national partners who have been reluctant to promote it alongside 
varieties such as K6 that were released by the local universities. ICRISAT made efforts to 
promote the variety through NGOs, but it still faces an adoption lag and has not been taken up on 
a large scale in the formal seed production process. Considering that India has a national system 
with a significantly higher capacity than the other two case study countries, this example raises 
the question of whether ICRISAT had a comparative advantage in developing and promoting its 
own variety in India. Seed promotion activities, such as agricultural extension services, are less 
prone to corruption than regulatory activities such as seed certification, at least as long as they do 
not involve the distribution of inputs. However, they are subject to problems of elite capture, 
since larger farmers and politically well-connected farmers are often more likely to benefit from 
extension services  (Birner et al., 2009, Feder et al., 2011). Hence, as in case of multiplication 
and certification activities, governance problems, more centralized governance structures may 
gain comparative advantage if they are better able to deal with these challenges, e.g., by 
involving NGOs that have a strong dedication to work with poor and disadvantaged farmers. 
6.2.8. Evaluation and impact assessment transactions 
Impact assessment and project reporting activities involve costs for data collection, analysis and 
write-up. These costs escalate when the centers have a large number of bilateral projects with 
small budgets that need to be reported separately. Projects that do not budget for evaluation 
 
 
  
 
   
26 
 
activities may be unable to show accountability to donors and therefore run the risk of losing 
additional funding. In terms of transaction-intensity, these projects can be assessed to have an 
intermediate level, since evaluation transactions are less frequent than promotion transactions. 
Still, they are also subject to governance challenges, since organizations have incentives to report 
good results in order to secure funding. As in case of certification transactions, limited 
organizational capacity will reduce the comparative advantage that more decentralized 
organizations would otherwise have. 
6.3.Summary of attributes of transactions 
Table 2 above summarizes the findings from the above discussion. The examples in the case 
study as well as the theoretical and literature-based assessment presented above shows that the 
attributes of economies of scale and potential for spillovers increase the comparative advantage 
(cost-effectiveness) of IARCs over NARES in carrying out the transaction. This finding is 
consistent with the literature on international public goods. What the framework adds to this 
literature is the identification of transaction-intensity and the scope for elite capture and 
corruption as important attributes. Unlike in case of spillovers and economies of scale, the effect 
of these attributes for the comparative efficiency of different governance structure is ambiguous:  
If intermediate or high transaction-intensity is combined with scope for elite capture or 
corruption, it will depend on the context whether the international centers or the national system 
will be more cost-effective. This topic is further discussed in the next section. 
6.4. The role of contextual factors 
An important factor emerging from the case studies and the hypothetical cost curves above is the 
influence of contextual factors, especially capacity of national systems as compared to those of 
international systems. Comprehensive cross-country data on the capacity of national research and 
extension systems are limited. The Rate of Return to investment may be seen as one indicator. As 
von Braun et al. (2008) found, the average rate of return (ROR) to NARS in developing countries 
is much lower than that of IARCs. In Africa, the median ROR for IARCs was found to be 83 
percent higher than that of NARS, while in Asia and Pacific the gap was 72 percent (von Braun et 
al., 2008).  
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The relatively lower returns to investments in national systems create a vicious cycle, since 
donors are less inclined in investing in these centers, hence their capacity remains low. As staff in 
national systems are often poorly compensated and have limited career options based on merit, 
they typically lack strong incentives to perform effectively. Until the world food crises of 2007-
2008, public funding for agricultural research declined considerably, especially in agriculture-
based countries (World Bank, 2007; Lynam et al., 2012).  
The example of the Green Revolution in Asia shows that developing countries can be successful 
in increasing the capacity of their national research and extension systems, if they have strong 
political incentives to do so. The Green Revolution is often seen as a technological revolution. 
However, it is equally the success of institutional capacity building. Much of its success can be 
attributed to India’s political interest to become food sufficient as well as the willingness of the 
US government and donors such as the World Bank, and Rockefeller and Ford Foundations to 
provide support. C. Subramanian, the then Indian Minister for Agriculture, championed a range 
of institutional reforms in the agricultural research, extension and education system of India that 
enabled the Green Revolution to materialize (Banerjee, 2013; Bhagat, 1998).  
The above framework suggests that the higher the institutional capacity of national systems, the 
less the IARCs should engage in downstream activities of seed multiplication and promotion. The 
fact that ICRISAT engaged in promoting its own variety in India indicates that the CGIAR 
centers may not base their engagement of a thorough analysis of their comparative advantage, 
taking context-specific factors into account. The reasons may be explained on political economy 
rather than efficiency grounds. The IARCs have to respond to donor demands to secure their own 
funding, even if there are trade-offs in terms of competition with national systems. They may find 
it more convenient to use donor funding to work with NGOs, rather than engaging in the difficult 
process of assisting government agencies to increase their institutional capacity and meet their 
governance challenges.  
7. Applying the Framework 
The empirical case studies presented in this paper were used to develop and illustrate the 
conceptual framework presented above. Further empirical research will be required to apply and 
test this framework. Different methodological approaches are available for this purpose. The 
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standard approach in empirical transaction cost economics does not require a measurement of 
transaction costs. The approach is rather to formulate hypotheses on the comparative advantage 
of different governance structures, depending on attributes and contextual factors, and then test 
these hypotheses empirically by finding out whether the governance structures with a predicted 
comparative advantages are indeed found more frequently in practice (Shelanski and Klein, 
1995). However, empirically quantifying attributes of transactions may also be challenging since 
variables such as asset specificity are difficult to measure. Although some surveys have used 
scaling methods (Brown and Potoski, 2003), such data are subject to the general limits of survey 
data since that they are based on the stated beliefs of respondents rather than those revealed 
through choice. The measurements, based on ordinal rankings, are also difficult to compare 
across institutions (Shelanski and Klein, 1995).  
In the case of agricultural research for development, an additional challenge needs to be 
considered: There is no market mechanism which ensures that the most efficient governance 
structures survive. Research managers, therefore, have to define the most appropriate institutional 
structures to achieve impact with a given set of resources. As discussed above, IARCs have to 
consider other factors than comparative efficiency when making these choices, and donors are 
likewise subject to political pressure to produce quick results rather than creating governance 
structures that are sustainable and efficient in the long run.  
If we apply the conceptual framework derived above to the case studies, we would expect that 
international agricultural research should play an important role in upstream research such as 
breeding improved varieties, for which the centers clearly have a comparative advantage. We 
would also expect that the centers only engage in downstream activities such as seed 
multiplication and promotion of the national systems have limited capacity. However, as shown 
above, this was not the case. In India, ICRISAT even entered into a competition with the national 
system. In the other two case study countries, the focus of carrying out multiplication and 
promotion activities through parallel systems is likely to reduce the incentives for national 
governments to overcome the governance challenges in their own systems. The framework 
presented above suggests that the CGIAR and their donors should device ways of addressing the 
capacity challenges instead of incentivizing centers to replace the activities of national systems. 
This would in the long run shift the cost curve for national systems (Figure 3) downwards, and 
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allow them to carry out the activities for which they have a comparative advantage if they are 
able to meet the governance challenges identified above. This long term vision to build NARS 
capacity to do applied and strategic research was already expressed by the Technical Advisory 
Committee (TAC) of the CGIAR in the early 1990s (McCalla, 2014). 
As the above discussion shows, the governance structures that are empirically observed may not 
be the most cost-effective ones. This has two methodological implications for further research. 
First, it will be useful to apply techniques to the measure transaction costs of the empirically 
observed governance structures directly to be able to compare their cost-effectiveness. While 
there are few empirical limitations so far, there is sufficient evidence that the empirical 
measurement of transaction costs is feasible (cf. Birner and Wittmer, 2004, and the literature 
quoted there). The second methodological implication is that there is a need to better understand 
the political economy underlying the decisions of donors and international research centers 
regarding the extent to which they engage in downstream activities.  
8. Conclusion  
International agricultural research aims to address a range of challenges facing resource-poor 
farmers in developing countries. For the intended benefits to be achieved, investments are 
required at all levels, from the international to the national. The analysis undertaken in this paper 
deals with long-standing concerns regarding governance of IARCs, which the currently ongoing 
CGIAR reform process aims to address. The review of past discussions in the literature and in 
various fora identified a gap in the available methodologies that would allow the CGIAR system 
to objectively tackle the dilemma of how the international centers should position themselves in 
the research-development spectrum. The IPG concept has been put forth as a criterion for 
identifying what the CGIAR centers should focus on, but there have been persistent difficulties in 
defining and operationalizing it. In this paper, a normative framework is developed to address the 
critical question of who should do what so that publicly funded international agricultural research 
can result in wider and sustained welfare benefits.  
The framework presented here applies transaction cost economics perspectives to conceptually 
analyze institutional options for carrying out activities along the research-development chain. 
This approach is consistent with earlier approaches, especially the IPG criterion, but it provides 
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additional insights, especially regarding the role of governance challenges and capacity 
constraints in influencing the comparative advantage of the CGIAR. Thus, the framework can be 
expected to provide a useful basis for strategic discussions on how far downstream the CGIARs 
should go, in a particular context, to achieve impact from agricultural R&D most cost-effectively. 
Based on the consideration of the relevant attributes of transactions and contextual factors, the 
framework makes it possible to assess the trade-offs involved in assigning an activity to IARCs, 
NARS or other actors in the innovation system.  
The differentiated approach used in the case studies shows that a complex set of factors, such as 
availability of funds and political pressure e.g. donor preferences will influence the decision to 
carry out specific activities. Donors have the goal to achieve impact in poor areas, but the main 
problem is the capacity gap of national organizations. There is a choice to be made between 
investment in the tedious and long-term task of strengthening local capacity, or avoiding these 
governance challenges by driving international centers into downstream activities. The example 
of ICRISAT’s research on groundnut improvement and promotion illustrates how IARCs are 
involved in activities for which they would not have a comparative advantage if the governance 
challenges of local systems were addressed. The findings are likely to apply to other research 
areas in which the international centers are involved. Ultimately, the findings of this study 
suggest that, to make international investment in agricultural research sustainable in the long-
term, the centers and their donors concentrate should concentrate on assisting national 
agricultural research and extension systems in building their own capacity, rather than 
substituting their activities.   
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Top Donors by Decade (Amount in US$ million) 
1971-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2010 
United States 105.7 United States 412.7 World Bank 426.8 United States 650.4 
World Bank 42.9 World Bank 236.0 United States 392.3 World Bank 539.9 
Canada 39.3 Japan 127.9 Japan 321.9 United Kingdom 389.4 
Germany 33.9 Canada 103.0 European 
Commission 
159.3 European 
Commission 
337.5 
IADB* 29.2 IADB* 88.8 Switzerland 149.7 Canada 298.2 
United Kingdom 23.7 Germany 87.5 Germany 146.7 BMGF*** 218.6 
Rockefeller 
Foundation 
21.2 United 
Kingdom 
78.1 Canada 143.6 Switzerland 198.5 
Ford Foundation 20.3 UNDP 72.1 Netherlands 110.3 Netherlands 185.6 
UNDP ** 19.3 European 
Commission 
67.3 United Kingdom 109.7 Japan 184.0 
Sweden 15.3 Switzerland 58.5 Denmark 102.8 Germany 170.6 
  Italy 58.5     
*Inter-American Development Bank,  ** United Nations Development Program , *** Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation (Began contributing in 2004) 
Source:  CGIAR Fund Office, 2011.  
 
 
Table 2: Transactions and their attributes 
Transactions 
Relevance of Attributes 
Economies of 
Scale (incl. asset 
specificity) 
Spillover 
Potential 
Transaction 
Intensity 
Scope for elite 
capture and 
corruption 
Planning and priority 
setting 
Generic goals 
 
High 
 
High 
 
Medium 
 
Low 
Location-specific 
goals Low Low High Medium 
Technology 
Development 
Basic - strategic 
High High Low Low 
Adaptive - 
participatory Low Low High Medium 
Field testing and 
varietal release Low Low High Medium 
Multiplication Low Low High Medium 
Certification Low Low Medium High 
Promotion Low Low High High 
Evaluation/impact 
assessment Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Source: Authors 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Primary domains across the research continnum 
 
Figure 1: Primary Domains across the research continuum of INRM. Source: CGIAR Science Council, 2006. 
ARI= Advanced Research Institute, IARC= International Agricultural Research Centre, NGO= Non-
Governmental Organization, NARES= National Agricultural Research and Extension System (NARES)  
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Figure 2 Process-Influence Map for Research and Promotion of Groundnut Variety CG7 in 
Malawi 
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Figure 3 : Comparative cost-effectiveness of conducting research by IARCs versus NARS 
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